Aoun’s parachute turns out to be a knapsack

 

The political scene has drastically changed in the past week. Who will the General side with now?

 

On Thursday, more than 24 hours after March 14 leaders announced that they would support a constitutional amendment to allow the election of Army Commander General Michel Sleiman, Free Patriotic Movement leader General Michel Aoun finally declared – though under somewhat ambiguous terms – that he also supports Sleiman’s bid for the presidency.

 

However, Aoun linked his support for the army commander with the initiative he proposed a week prior, one day before the end of the constitutional deadline. In the initiative, Aoun called for an interim president – to be appointed by the General himself – who would stay in office for less than two years, pending general elections in 2009 under a new electoral law. So it seems that Aoun is only on board with Sleiman if his presidency were to be under these terms. While evasive on the details, Aoun also said in Thursday’s press conference he would call for the Hezbollah-led opposition to meet and announce an official decision on the issue.

 

Although the popular protests he called for next week are still on, it looks like Aoun may be trapped. Last week, he tried to designate himself as the primary Christian leader and political kingmaker, releasing his initiative and referring to himself as the “political patriarch,” but the majority largely ignored him and went ahead with their nomination of Sleiman for president. By accepting to be used by Hezbollah as a tool to threaten the government and provoke a Christian-Sunni rift, he found himself cornered between bad and worse options: instigating civil disobedience and being seen as an obstructionist, or accepting someone else’s candidacy. Aoun is also facing increasing divisions within his own parliamentary bloc, with MPs Michel al-Murr and Elias Skaff allegedly favoring a Sleiman presidency regardless of Aoun’s position. Murr is even rumored to the primary architect of the March 14 strategy on Sleiman, sketched out through meetings held between him and the majority without the General’s knowledge or consent.

 

On Wednesday, an economic delegation that had visited Aoun in Rabieh quoted him as saying that he would not oppose amending the constitution, if need be, as long as it provides for the president to be elected by direct suffrage, in contrast to the current system whereby the parliament chooses the president. However, only two days later, Aoun has shifted his position once again, tentatively supporting Sleiman’s nomination with no reference to popular vote.

 

Unable to reject Sleiman’s candidacy outright, Aoun instead agreed to support the bid – again, apparently only within the framework of his initiative; he also referenced possible obstacles to amending the constitution. The Lebanese daily As-Safir said that on Thursday, ahead of the weekly Change and Reform bloc meeting, Aoun dispatched an envoy to Sleiman informing him of the General’s positive stance on his candidacy.

 

According to the daily, Aoun’s support for Sleiman during the bloc’s meeting came as a surprise to its members, especially Murr. “I tell you, I was the first one to suggest General Sleiman, and MP Michel al-Murr is my witness,” Aoun told his bloc.

 

“I even discussed Sleiman’s candidacy with MP Saad Hariri during our meetings in France,” Aoun declared. “Hariri told me there were serious obstacles facing his candidacy,” he added. This quote is particularly telling, as it serves as a reminder of why Aoun and other opposition members did originally support the army commander: because they were convinced March 14 would never accept him.

 

 

After realizing some time ago that the presidency was, for the time being, outside his grasp, Aoun decided to play the game differently and launched his initiative. By supporting an alternate candidate – albeit conditionally, under a wholly unconstitutional framework – Aoun thought he could throw the ball back in the majority’s court. When March 14 would reject the initiative, the presidency would remain up for grabs and Aoun would safe from blame for prolonging the vacuum; at the same time, the FPM’s longtime claim that Aoun is the sole guarantor of Lebanon’s Christians would be reinforced.

 

This misdirection was also an attempt to re-establish himself as a major player, to save his political career and to try and secure himself a place of prominence in any deal, especially regarding the next government.

Hezbollah MP Mohammad Raad told Naharnet last week that Hezbollah”s presidential candidate is Michel Aoun, “or whoever is chosen by General Aoun.”

“It will be difficult to agree on any candidate of whom General Aoun is not convinced,” Raad added.

 

But March 14 changed the rules of the game when it put its weight behind Sleiman, widely seen – and every sporadically promoted – as the preferred candidate of both the opposition and its Syrian backers. So far, the opposition still has not figured out exactly how to respond. Resigned Hezbollah Minster Mohammad Fneish told Lebanese radio Wednesday that Lebanon needs to reach a compromise based on an objective analysis of the internal political situation that includes the recognition of Aoun’s role in any solution. Commenting on Sleiman’s candidacy, Fneish said that Aoun’s consent is a prerequisite for any agreement.

 

As for the issue of a constitutional amendment, he asked if such a thing is even possible during the administration of an “illegitimate government.”

 

Many, of course, believe that the opposition in general, but particularly Hezbollah (and its Syrian patrons) has little interest in seeing a new president any time soon, preferring instead to prolong the vacuum. Hezbollah’s decision to make support for any candidate dependent on Michel Aoun has been widely interpreted as a ploy to keep the seat empty, with the party banking on Aoun’s intransigence over the candidacy of anyone but himself.

 

However, its unlikely that Hezbollah leaders would go so far as to independently reject Sleiman’s nomination now that their main allies, Amal and Aoun, are at least theoretically on board with sending the army commander to Baabda.

 

After all, Hezbollah needs the support of Amal and Aoun for any hope of obtaining a veto-wielding third in the next government. Aoun, on the other hand, clings to Hezbollah as the only party outside of his own bloc that still supports his candidacy (in words, at least) and accepts him as “political patriarch” of the Christians. They both need each other and are stuck at the point of no return: Betraying the other would be political suicide. However, staying attached to Hezbollah could mean a slow death for Aoun’s political ambitions even outside of the presidency. How long can Aoun maintain his popular support while in bed with Hezbollah, especially considering that much of that support came in reaction to the 2005 quadripartite alliance between Hezbollah, Amal, Jumblatt and Hariri?

 

 

So it comes as no surprise that Aoun’s position on Sleiman should be vague. But the General will have to make a decision on Sleiman very soon, either giving him his full support or applying impossible conditions to his candidacy. Aoun has tried to cast himself as the source of any solution – so obstructing Sleiman would mean playing a very dangerous game. If he insists over the coming days on linking support for Sleiman with his initiative and uses street demonstrations as a way to pressure the government, he might back himself even further into a corner and find himself more and more marginalized politically.

 

As part of the military institution, Sleiman presents a political threat to Aoun because he will lure away a number of Aoun’s key supporters from among the army’s high-ranking officers. Moreover, Aoun’s idea of a two-year military government is simply never going to happen: Both the majority and, crucially, the Patriarch, have rejected such a scheme. If Sleiman becomes president, it will be for the full six years.

 

The majority’s surprise reversal on Sleiman’s candidacy was certainly not a universally popular move, and it remains to be seen whether or not it was a wise one. However, by putting March 14’s collection weight behind a candidate backed by the opposition, they may well succeed in calling March 8’s bluff and forcing their rivals to finally participate in the election of a new president.

 

Aoun is out of options, especially if he hopes to preserve some share of political power for himself and his bloc. Opening the door for Sleiman may have finally shut the door on Aoun’s own presidential ambitions, once and for all.