A failed Lebanon would impose heavy costs on Syria, too

 

The increasing brazenness with which Syria is aligning its positions on Lebanon”s (supposedly internal) political crisis with those of local opposition parties should be a source of embarrassment to the latter. This is also true of the mutual parroting that goes on between parties that support Prime Minister Fouad Siniora”s embattled government and their backers in the West. The difference is that, having spent so much time dealing with Lebanese issues in the past and being destined to feel the effects of whatever happens here in the future, the Syrians ought to know better.

 

It is still not too late for Damascus to play a positive role in efforts to break the logjam in Beirut. This is not to say that the opposition”s main component, Hizbullah, takes its orders from Syria, but there is no denying that the two have had a long relationship that has produced highly productive moments for both – and for Lebanon as a whole. They cannot help, therefore, but to have influence over one another. This was true when their partnership – with the support of some of the Lebanese parties now arrayed against Hizbullah – led to the liberation of South Lebanon, and it still has the capacity to help the Lebanese avoid another period of suffering.

 

Some Syrian officials may be trying to buy time until what they expect will be major changes to American foreign policy once US President George W. George Bush leaves office in January 2009. Their prediction may well be accurate, and this newspaper certainly hopes so, but that will count for little if Lebanon collapses into anarchy in the meantime. Much more is at stake for Damascus than the scoring of a few political points in its former stomping ground. People”s lives and livelihoods are at stake, and not only in Lebanon: This country and Syria are entwined not just by ancient history and modern politics but also by a far-ranging web of commercial and family ties. Those who are part of such relationships stand to face severe hardships if Lebanon cannot soon resume the functions of a relatively normal country.
 

All this is not to mention, of course, the daunting challenges to Syrian stability that would accompany Lebanon”s return to failed statehood. Already this country”s attractiveness and vulnerability to international terrorist groups is rubbing off on Syria in several ways, and even if Bush”s successor is less aggressive, Damascus can expect little in the way of forgiveness if it is judged to have helped push Lebanon over the edge – or even to have refrained from trying to help. That could only result in further isolation that would undermine both Syria”s economy and its admirable determination to recover the Golan Heights occupied by Israel since 1967.

 

Of course, no lone hand can clap by itself: Nothing Damascus and Hizbullah do to ease tensions in Lebanon will succeed unless their respective counterparts (Washington and the March 14 Forces, for example) are ready to reciprocate. Nonetheless, the Syrians have a better chance of hastening such a quid pro quo, or at least of garnering some much-needed goodwill, by encouraging their Lebanese allies to be more flexible.