Hear Michel Sleiman, then think of Michel Aoun

 

It was a frustrated army commander, Michel Sleiman, who told the As-Safir daily in an interview published Thursday that he was “tired of the ongoing bickering over my name as a consensus presidential candidate.” As the general put it: “If one side nominates me, the other objects. If one country backs my nomination, other countries object … Every time we make a step forward, we find ourselves” facing more demands.

 

Sleiman announced that he would end his term in office this coming August, which poses fresh problems for the republic. No doubt the general will find many gathering at his doorstep asking him to stay on. No doubt he will calculate whether this might improve or harm the prospect of new conflict in Lebanon and, perhaps, even the prospect of his being elected president. One thing Sleiman left unmentioned, but that is circulating with rancor in his circles, is that the Arab League plan to give him a balancing role as head of state has been effectively blocked by another Maronite general who happens to be watching his own power seep away.

 

It would be too easy to blame everything on Michel Aoun. So let’s be reasonable, then, and blame only most of the presidential deadlock on him. The reality is that whatever Syria or Hizbullah says, were Aoun truly interested in seeing a president elected other than himself, he would have announced his forthcoming attendance, with the March 14 majority, at a parliamentary session to vote Sleiman or anyone else in as president. The formation of a government, he might have added, could take place after that, based on procedures spelled out in the constitution. 

 

It’s funny, we’re not hearing much from Aoun these days. Here was the general thinking back in November that a presidential vacuum would boost his prospects of being elected; here was Aoun fantasizing that he would manipulate Christian rage, as he had so many times before, to lift himself right into the Baabda palace. But not for the first time, the firecracker exploded in Aoun’s face. The Christians, far from being blindly enraged, saw quite clearly the game Aoun was playing. Far from metamorphosing into sheep, they took their distance from the general.

 

In fact, that reaction has reached into the Aounist movement itself. The movement has had to delay its elections because of internal discord. Part of the problem is that many of those supposedly in positions of responsibility in the movement cannot stomach the undue influence of Gebran Bassil, Aoun’s son-in-law. As an ambassador once informed us, Aoun is gaga in the young man’s presence. Perhaps the other Aounist leaders are also sensing that Bassil is, in the end, and through his close ties to Sleiman Franjieh, Syria’s nominee to take over the leadership of the Free Patriotic Movement once Aoun hurries into the sunset. 

 

You have doubts about what we’re saying? Well, then, consider Michel al-Murr, who is nothing if not a good judge of power. If he continues to beat up on Aoun as he has been doing of late, it’s because he can smell the rot setting into the movement. It’s now profitable politics to abuse Aoun in the Metn, which is how Murr is building up his credibility for the coming parliamentary elections, though heaven knows when they will happen.

 

What is Aoun to do? With his own movement in crisis and most Christians increasingly disillusioned with the general’s destructive actions, it’s obvious what would save him: Aoun has to announce that he will order his bloc to go to parliament, with the March 14 coalition, and elect a new president. Once he makes that announcement, all bets can be off. We could have a genuinely democratic election, one that includes Michel Sleiman but also other candidates. Aoun could put forward a candidate he favors, even himself. By creating a quorum, he would ensure that a vote does take place and that the constitution is respected.

 

What would Aoun gain in doing so? His partisans will bristle at the fact that the general would get little out of this. After all, the chances that he or one of his favorites would be elected by March 14 are negligible. True. But what Aoun would do is precisely what he has long claimed he wants to do: reinforce the authority of the state and bolster Lebanese democracy and the rule of law. His prestige would gain immeasurably, even if he doesn’t become president. Given that he has no hope of being president anyway and that his prestige is disintegrating, more prestige would be a net gain.

 

We have no expectations that Aoun will listen to our appeal, of course. We can confirm that he is a man who thinks a lot about assassination, mostly when it involves himself. If the Syrians don’t want an election, then who is he to rock the boat by disagreeing with them? Calling for an open vote in parliament is a risk that Aoun, who rarely steps out of his Rabieh bunker out of fear that the sky might fall on his head, is unwilling to take. But we do still hope. We hope that he might display some courage and reconsider.

 

So when you next hear a tired Michel Sleiman express much dissatisfaction, do spare a thought for Michel Aoun, who is the main cause of that dissatisfaction. We don’t have a president largely because Aoun doesn’t want to tip the balance in favor of those seeking to elect a president. That’s really a winning strategy. But then again, Aoun was always winning in pursuing his ambitions over Lebanon’s carcass.