Hizbullah”s invasion and occupation of Beirut has understandably prompted much discussion of its claim that it would never use its weapons against fellow Lebanese. The participation of other groups in the operation demonstrated conclusively that Hizbullah did not field the only militia in the country. Amal is armed to the teeth and played a major role alongside Hizbullah. Although the much smaller Syrian Social Nationalist Party (SSNP) did no real fighting, contenting itself with trashing the old Future TV building in Raouche and setting it ablaze, SSNP militiamen were given sentry duty by Hizbullah. After Hizbullah took over Hamra and overwhelmed scant resistance, it transferred the area to the SSNP, which set up checkpoints. In the aftermath of these events, any frank discussion of the threat posed by Hizbullah should include reference to its Amal and SSNP allies.
More importantly, such discussion will inevitably turn to the Lebanese Army and its role in the recent events. The respect the army commands among many Lebanese is evident, though it should not escape notice that the opposition rejected Saad Hariri”s proposal to place at the army”s discretion a final decision to transfer the head of airport security, Wafiq Shuqair, and a decision about how to handle Hizbullah”s illegal telecommunications network. After Prime Minister Fouad Siniora officially granted the army decision-making powers regarding the two contentious issues, the army froze the government”s moves against Shuqair and the telecom network. The opposition then agreed to withdraw its militia from the streets, to be replaced by the army.
Yet the army”s performance during the recent events leaves much to be desired. From the early morning of May 7, when opposition supporters went on a rampage, the army did not intervene to stop vandalism or the blocking of roads, but simply cordoned off areas so that the rioting would not spread. Disturbingly, this minimalist approach continued even after Hizbullah began its armed insurrection on May 8. On the morning of May 9, the army relayed a message from opposition militia to the offices of Future TV. The message warned employees that if they did not depart immediately, the militiamen would take control of the premises. The army officer who relayed the message advised Future TV employees to leave and place control of the complex in the hands of the military, which would undertake to protect it from any attack. The station”s employees left under military escort and the premises remain under army control.
This extraordinary development, which set the stage for subsequent climb-downs by the Future Movement and the Progressive Socialist Party, indicates that fears concerning a split in the army have become debilitating. Whether such fears are well-founded or simply a lingering psychological effect of the Civil War – when the army split along sectarian lines – remains unclear. What is painfully obvious, however, is that such fears have hamstrung the army and allowed Hizbullah to act largely with impunity. Worse, constant reference to the army”s "neutrality" seems to have bred acceptance that it should remain neutral during an armed insurrection against a democratically elected government, and that no attempt should be made to prevent insurrectionists from occupying the capital. Few have noticed the irony of the army”s assuming the duties of a messenger. Fewer still have commented that if the army was aware of the opposition”s plans to attack Future TV, it should have stopped them.
That said, the army was hardly inactive during the opposition”s onslaught. Even as Hizbullah and its allies were overrunning western Beirut, the army deployed to protect sensitive sites within areas that fell under opposition control. The homes of Saad Hariri and Walid Jumblatt were ringed with military detachments. And once Hizbullah and Amal had overcome heavily Sunni Tariq al-Jadideh, the army took control of the neighborhood”s entry and exit points – in a bid to avoid further sectarian tension. Later, when a local funeral procession was fired upon and six people killed, the army chased down and caught the gunman.
Nevertheless, one is left with the terrifying realization that should an extra-governmental armed group decide to launch an insurrection, the army”s intervention will hinge on whether the group in question enjoys popular support. This does not apply only to Hizbullah, which has now fully capitalized on the unfortunate situation. Indeed, we may have already had an inkling of what such paralysis means down the road: The army did not intervene in the battle between the Future Movement and the SSNP in Halba on May 10, a confrontation that lasted seven hours and during which 14 people were killed, most of them SSNP members. The army apparently did not want to further enrage Sunnis by interfering in a fight in which they clearly had the upper hand.
Such timidity does not bode well for future outbreaks of violence. Thanks to Hizbullah”s invasion and occupation of Beirut, we can now expect to see an upsurge in Sunni Islamist militancy. Closing an eye to this phenomenon would be disastrous; yet cracking down on Sunni militants while the Shiite Hizbullah retains its arms would be equally catastrophic. As a result, there has never been a more pressing need to discuss the disarmament of Hizbullah. Indeed, the March 14 forces must make this issue their priority in any future dialogue, assuming they are able to place that on the agenda given the profound pressure they are under today. Not only is the disarmament of Hizbullah an end in itself, it is now the only way the Lebanese state will be able to justify decisive action against looming Sunni militancy. For both endeavors to succeed, it will fall upon the army to take the initiative, using its moral standing to convince Hizbullah to disarm, and its intelligence capability and prowess in the field to prevent Sunni armament.
Rayyan al-Shawaf is a freelance writer and reviewer based in Beirut. He wrote this commentary for THE DAILY STAR.