Whose Interest Does Michel Aoun”s Obstruction Serve?
As much as the opposition in Lebanon, represented by Hezbollah, escalates against the appointed Prime Minister and his political team, it becomes clear how pale and insignificant the role was of deputy Michel Aoun, the leader of the Change and Reform Bloc in his sectarian campaign against the Sunni community and the powers of the prime minister, in his personal campaign against President Michel Suleiman, and in his targeting the ministerial posts whose candidates the president believed it was his prerogative to nominate. Aoun has proved that he is a glass front for the real positions dictated by the real driving force of the opposition, namely Hezbollah.
For a short while, Aoun”s supporters among the Christians believed that his moves were triggered by "patriotic" motivations tied to retrieving the status of the Christians in the political system and fending the ghost of sectarianism off the internal strife through his famous "understanding" with Hezbollah, an understanding which Aoun considered a form of preserving national unity.
However, the recent campaign by Hezbollah”s officials against the state and its institutions and their warnings over the appointments in security positions which they believe should be stamped with their seal of approval revealed the real role of General Aoun as a façade to serve several purposes; to allow Hezbollah to penetrate the first tier Christian leaderships; to place Maronite impediments in the face of Michel Suleiman”s era; to use Aoun as part of the campaign against the PM powers enshrined in the Taef Accord, against the Future Movement, and against the conciliatory Saudi role in the Lebanese conflict, a role which Hezbollah had avoided targeting directly before the new escalatory phase it has recently entered.
All this makes Aoun”s obstruction of the formation of the first cabinet in the new era understandable. This obstruction targets three primary powers, though it serves no direct interest of Aoun”s or of the Christian side that he claims representing. This only proves the theory that Aoun represents a glass façade.
The first power targeted by Aoun”s campaign is the president himself. It is no secret that the obstruction of the government is primarily a blow to the era of President Michel Suleiman who came to power supported by distinguished regional and international momentum although he still lacks significant domestic support which he can use to expand the locus of his rule. Aoun is still far from getting over his "complex" triggered by the rise of another Maronite to the Baabda Palace, and hence his explicit demand for expanding his share in the cabinet to "compensate for his sacrifice" of the presidency. Such targeting does not only weaken the presidency, a Christian position that the leaders of the majority had worked diligently to reactivate after a long phase of paralysis, but it also weakens the state itself since the presidency is associated with a significant symbolic weight that represents the unity of the state and the strength of its institutions.
The second targeted power is Prime Minister Fouad Siniora and the status of the Sunni community in Lebanon. As usual, Aoun launched a campaign by proxy, one that does not serve any of his presumed interests but rather the interests of the Hezbollah-led camp which did not hide its annoyance with the reappointment of Siniora to lead the new cabinet. Aoun”s short-sighted campaign has pushed the Sunni leaders, including those who were in the opposition where Aoun sees himself as a lead figure, to adopt a united stance in defense of the premiership.
The third targeted party by Aoun”s campaign is the Taef Accord and everything it represents on the regional level as well as its role in rebuilding the domestic political balances. Regardless of the remarks that any side may have regarding this accord, including Aoun himself, it is worth recalling that it was those wars which Aoun waged by proxy in 1989 and 1990 that imposed the Taef Accord balances that Aoun opposed and continues to oppose in what became Lebanon”s new constitution. Yet, the new campaign against the Taef Accord conceals a much bigger demand that has nothing to do with Aoun and his interest, mostly the demand to redistribute power in the state among three partners, namely the Shiites, Sunnis and Christians on the basis of the demographic and political power that Hezbollah believes its popular base enjoys today and which was not noted in the Taef Accord seventeen years earlier.
By Elias Harfoush