March 14 alliance gained some victories and suffered some defeats
Mohammad Salam
The formation of the first government of President Michel Sleiman’s term allowed the March 14 coalition to achieve six victories:
The first (and most important) victory, which is the basis of all other victories, is summed up by the blow that was dealt to the Hezbollah-led minority when Prime Minister Fouad Siniora was designated to form the government. Siniora remained in the Serail, and the opposition withdrew, with their tents, from Riad al-Solh Square.
The second victory was achieved by PM Siniora when he succeeded in forming a government, so that President Michel Sleiman, whose election is also a victory for the constitution, will not confront future “honest promises” alone without a government by his side. Coincidence may have played a role in this respect, since the formation decree was issued on the eve of the second anniversary of the wretched 2006 war in which Lebanon was defeated while victory was someone else’s.
The third victory is that the Justice Ministry was allocated to none other than the Lebanese Forces, which had supported the Taif Accord and handed over their weapons to the state during the Syrian occupation… They were undermined because they refused to submit to the occupier. They were persecuted, their activities prohibited and their leader jailed for 11 years, after which he resurfaced… having secured the Justice Ministry.
The fourth victory was achieved by the March 14 coalition against the hegemony of Hezbollah and its allies over Shia representation. Ibrahim Shamseddine was appointed as minister expressing a mixed Lebanese, Shia and Arab point of view within the executive power, a point of view that says no to the Guardianship of the Jurist in its traditional Jabal Amel area of influence in Lebanon.
The fifth victory is a comparative one represented by the fact that the March 14 coalition managed to include in the government an independent Shia figure that is not affiliated to its organizational structure, namely Ibrahim Shamseddine. Indeed, the latter is a symbolic figure since he is the son of late Imam Mohammad Mahdi Shamseddine, who left behind his renowned national commandments. In contrast, the Hezbollah-led party failed to find any Sunni figure who would agree to represent it in the government.
The sixth victory is a collective one, since the March 14 coalition managed to be represented by four independent ministers – one Sunni, one Shia, one Orthodox and another Catholic minister – whereas the Hezbollah-led party failed to come up with a single candidate from any community. Indeed, the concept of independence seems to be forbidden in the Memorandum of Understanding between Hezbollah and its affiliates.
In contrast, the March 14 coalition was plagued with two defeats, which sparked frustration among the coalition’s supporters. Accordingly, it is necessary to uproot the underlying causes so that this feeling of frustration does not expand and turn into lack of concern in the 2009 elections, considering that this is still merely the tip of the iceberg.
The March 14 coalition was defeated because it inexplicably rushed, without any constitutional pretext, into rejecting the ministerial nomination of former Minister and SSNP leader Ali Kanso. It later retracted this position to the detriment of Future Movement leader MP Saad Hariri, who took the person behind this mistake and bailed him out of the stalemate he had gotten himself into.
Even though the political conflict between Kanso and the March 14 coalition predates his feats during the invasion of Beirut, his ministerial appointment give the government’s action a definite edge if this nomination is exploited correctly: It would actually consolidate the March 14 public opinion and undermine the coherence of minority Christians while paving the way for the emergence of independent Christians.
Still, this defeat was predictable; Qanso joined the government as minister of state rather than minister of youth and sports, as Speaker Berri had officially proposed. This portfolio was, instead, allocated to Minister Talal Arslan knowing that Hariri had approved of his nomination, albeit without being granted any specific portfolio as Hezbollah had told him.
The March 14 coalition lost its standing, while Hezbollah lost its credibility.
Yet, wouldn’t it have been better had the March 14 coalition reaped the “benefits” of Kanso’s nomination without losing face by rejecting it in the first place?
The March 14 coalition was also defeated because some of its forces did not have an accurate reading of its Christians’ needs: they thus ranted and stormed before accepting what had been proposed in the first place.
Wouldn’t it have been more constructive to accept things quietly without fiery speeches that cause Christian nightmares later exploited by opposition media outlets?
The March 14 coalition should realize that, in order to confront future events, it has no other choice but to organize the “sectarian” situation on the front. Indeed, this is what happened in practice in Tariq al-Jedideh, in the North, in the Bekaa and in the Druze Mountain. And this is what will happen in the Christian part of the Mountain if, God forbid, it is to be tested.
The elections ten months from now will be waged on purely sectarian bases, and this holds true even for the “laymen” who will run for the seats allocated to “their confessions.” They may win or lose, depending on the votes of other confessions, but this only proves one of the following two options: Either Lebanon witnesses a state of sectarian coalition, as the March 14 coalition should be, or it witnesses a state of sectarian affiliation, as is the case of the Hezbollah-led party.