The Role of Arms: From Gaza to Lebanon
Whether in Palestinian Gaza, Lebanese Tripoli or in other spots that witness from time to time futile domestic clashes, there is now an urgent need to debate the role of the weapons in the hands of the young men of the neighborhoods and streets, weapons that were at first took up under the attractive slogans of liberation before they ended up used in internal strife as the case is today.
Since arms resemble dormant volcanoes, the explosion had to be somewhere. The calm on the frontlines with Israel – in the name of the cease fire in Gaza or as a natural consequence of the July 2006 war in Lebanon inevitably – had to force the arms out of their peace on the borders to another front at the expense of civilians and civilian lives and security, the very things that arms were meant to protect. Hence the arms of liberation became arms exploited in internal strife and possible civil wars. To ordinary citizens at the mercy of these arms, it no longer matters whether they are killed and displaced at the hands of the enemy or at the hands of neighbors and brothers coming for aid and protection. The struggle between Hamas and the conflicting factions in Gaza – like the wars of Bab el-Tebbeneh, Baal Muhsin, and before that the wars of Saadnayel and Taalbaya, or those of Tariq al-Jdeedeh in Beirut – becomes part of a panoramic futile scene where arms vent their anger on their own people as it becomes too difficult to do so in the natural outlets against the enemy.
Following the example of Arab regimes where military establishments evolved into security apparatuses with an eye on citizens rather than on the borders as a result of the prevailing truce there, this contagious effect is now feared to hit the resistance which is being forced by the high political, economic and military costs of the confrontation with Israel to direct its weapons to the interior, always in the name of its right to liberation.
Since this right is "sacred" as the slogan goes, any debate over the use of the resistance arms to claim political power at home becomes prohibited, especially with the freezing of the natural role of arms at the borders. For example, it is a taboo to discuss the factors leading to the calm reached by Hamas with Israel through Egyptian mediation despite the anger this calm instigated among organizations that consider themselves more radical than the Islamic movement such as Jaysh al-Islam. The same applies to the search for a role for the resistance arms in Lebanon in the context of the so-called "defensive strategy" under the new circumstances that emerged in the past two years.
There was no problem with the arming of Hamas and Fatah in Gaza. There was no distinction between the attacks launched by Al-Qassam Brigades or Al-Aqsa Brigades when the Palestinian guns were pointed at the same targets. Martyrs fell for both sides in the face of the same enemy. They were not murdered by "anonymous" hands at the Gaza shores in a way that demands an investigation to identify the culprits. So was the case in Lebanon when the function of the resistance in Lebanon was clear during the struggle for liberation, when no one demanded the definition of the role and functionality of the resistance”s arms. The most serious outcome of the recent developments was the fear that the arms of the resistance would become that of a distinct community with a distinct sectarian identity in Lebanon and a distinct political flavor in Gaza.
Accusing the other of treachery is not an appropriate answer to the questions surrounding the function of the resistance”s arms. The resistance does not enjoy this luxury which by the way is the shortest path to civil war. This function must be reconsidered within a unified national framework, on the basis of national unity whose goals and costs all agree to in Lebanon, and on the basis of a radical review of the cost of continuous division over the resistance in Palestine. In the least, successful truces and negotiations with the enemy, even if mediated by foreign parties, should be accompanied by negotiations of the same weight and significance with partners at home.