Report of the Lebanon Independent Border Assessment Team
Report
Executive Summary
1. Security Council resolution 1701 (2006) called upon the Government of Lebanon to secure its borders and all entry points to prevent the entry into Lebanon without its consent of arms or related material.
2. At the invitation of the Security Council, and in close liaison with the Government of Lebanon, the Secretary-General dispatched to Lebanon a team of border security experts, (the Lebanon Independent Border Assessment Team (LIBAT I), to fully assess the monitoring of Lebanon”s border with the Syrian Arab Republic and to report back to the Council on its findings and recommendations in this regard. The team visited Lebanon from 27 May to 15 June 2007 and submitted its report (hereinafter referred to as the LIBAT I report) to the Secretary-General on 22 June 2007. The report was forwarded to the Security Council on 26 June 2007.
3. In accordance with the request of the Security Council in its Presidential Statement of 3 August 2007 (S/PRST/2007/19), the Secretary-General stated his intention to dispatch, in coordination with the Government of Lebanon, a border security team (LIBAT II) to Lebanon to perform a follow-up assessment of the border security situation, to assess the implementation of the recommendations of the LIBAT I report and to provide any further recommendations to enhance Lebanon”s border security.
4. From 15 July to 31 July 2008 the LIBAT II was dispatched to Lebanon. During this period the Team held talks with key actors in the Lebanese Government, the directors of the four agencies involved in border security and their local commanders, stakeholders in the Northern Border Pilot Project and representatives of donor nations.
5. The Team visited all four operational border crossing points and a further one scheduled to be opened. The Team also visited a number of locations along the Green Border in the north and east of Lebanon, including locations of Lebanon-Syrian territorial dispute and cross-border areas under Palestinian control. It also visited Beirut airport and the seaports of Beirut and Tripoli.
6. LIBAT II concluded that, even taking into consideration the difficult political situation in Lebanon during the past year, and not withstanding the activities of the Northern Border Pilot Project and the Common Border Force, the rate of progress and implementation of the LIBAT I recommendations has been insufficient. It can be viewed primarily as having achieved, at most, disconnected islands of progress without a decisive impact on overall border security.
7. To a certain degree the Northern Border Pilot Project has incorporated a number of the LIBAT I recommendations. Although not always exploited to their full potential, this incorporation does constitute a move in the right direction.
8. At the border crossing points and in particular along the Green Border in the east, little progress was observed. This is despite the fact that a number of the LIBAT I recommendations could have been easily implemented without political, structural or financial implications.
9. There were, however, some positive steps. These included the almost completed relocation of the Aboudieh border crossing point to the actual border, the installation of additional border security equipment such as scanners and computerization of passport control and more.
10. The overall situation renders Lebanon”s borders as penetrable as was the case one year ago during the LIBAT I assessment.
11. LIBAT II, therefore, reiterates the recommendations put forward in its previous report as they remain as valid now as they were one year ago.
12. As a supplementary recommendations it is suggested that the Government of Lebanon instigates without delay the formulation of a strategic plan which should include its desired end-state and objectives as well as the ways and means of achieving them.
13. It is further recommended that the donor nations actively ensure that the coordination and cooperation of their activities is enhanced in order to achieve the optimum output from their efforts.
I. Introduction
A. Security Council resolution 1701 (2008)
I. Security Council resolution 1701 (2006) called upon the Government of Lebanon to secure its borders and other entry points to prevent the entry into Lebanon without its consent of arms or related material. Paragraph 15 of the same resolution outlined measure that States should take to prevent the supply of arms or other military assistance to any entity or individual other than those authorized by the Government of Lebanon or UNIFIL.
B. LIBAT I
2. In its Presidential Statement of 17 April 2007 (S/PRST/2007/ 12), the Security Council endorsed the Secretary-General”s intention to ensure the implementation of resolution 1701 (2006) and invited him to dispatch at the earliest, in close liaison with the Lebanese Government, an independent assessment mission to fully assess the monitoring of the border … and to report back to the Council … on its findings and recommendations in this regard. Accordingly, the Secretary-General dispatched to Lebanon a team of border security experts, known as the Lebanon Independent Border Assessment Team (LIBAT I), to fully assess the monitoring of Lebanon”s border with the Syrian Arab Republic. The team visited Lebanon from 27 May to 15 June 2007 and submitted its report and recommendation (hereinafter referred to as the LIBAT I report) to the Secretary-General on 22 June 2007. The report was forwarded to the Security Council on 26 June 2007.
C. LIBAT II
3. In accordance with the request of the Security Council in its presidential statement of 3 August 2007 (S/PRST/2007/29) and with a view to assess thoroughly the implementation of the recommendations of the LIBAT I report, and update the Council, the Secretary-General stated his intention to dispatch a team to Lebanon to carry out an assessment in coordination with the Government of Lebanon. The Team consisted of Lasse Christensen, Team Leader (Denmark) and Arno Langanke (Germany), both border security experts, Sherronne Blake Lobban (Jamaica), a customs expert, and Colonel (Retd) Cohn Doyle (Ireland), an expert on military issues.
II. Methodology
4. The Team carried out its mandate in coordination with the Government of Lebanon and the four most relevant security agencies, namely, the Lebanese Armed Forces, the Internal Security Forces, General Security, and General Customs, This approach was facilitated by the Government”s full and comprehensive support. All meetings and site visits requested, whether with members of the Government, security agencies or donors, were readily accommodated. The Office of the United Nations Special Coordinator for Lebanon (UNSCOL) was especially helpful in facilitating all of the Team”s requests to visit specific locations and meet with officials. The team met with the Prime Minister, Minister of Defense, the directors of the four security agencies and regional military commanders. Field visits were made to all border crossing points and other areas along the Green Border. In addition, a helicopter flight allowed the Team to observe a large part of the Lebanese Syrian border. Its assessment focused on the technical aspects of border security and management. The Team”s present report should be read in conjunction with the report of LIBAT I.
III. Background
A. Political Situation
5. According to Lebanese officials, the deterioration of the political situation in Lebanon subsequent to the LIBAT I mission hindered the adoption of many decisions necessary for the further implementation of the LIBAT I recommendations. This was especially so for those actions requiring changes in the legal framework or that would have major financial or political implications. Various Lebanese interlocutors the Team met with expressed their hope that the recent improvement in the political situation would enable further progress on border issues with political implications such as the delineation and demarcation of the border and a single bother security authority.
B. Common Border Force
6. As stated in the LIBAT I report (and other assessments) one of the most significant issues that would contribute to an enhanced border security approach would be increased coordination and cooperation between the Lebanese security agencies that are tasked with border security. In order to achieve this, the Common Border Force (CBF) was established, comprising all four agencies involved in border security under the framework of the German-led Northern Border Pilot Project (NBPP). The official BCPs do not form part of the CBF”s remit.
7. The project was proposed at a meeting between the Lebanese Prime Minister and the German Ambassador in November 2006. Approval to proceed was received in January 2001. German advisers, together with their Lebanese partners, designed a pilot project [to] assess Lebanon”s capability, with donor assistance, in securing its northern border. A major factor of the project was to integrate the four Lebanese security institutions concerned with border protection tasks namely the Lebanese Armed Forces, the Internal Security Forces, General Security and General Customs into a coordinated operational unit called the CBF. The project has received contributions from donor countries and the European Union (EU). The CBF became operational in December 2007.
8. The Lebanese Border Security Committee was established and is comprised of senior representatives from the different security agencies under the chairmanship of the head of the Internal Security Forces. A Project Implementation Unit headed by a colonel from the Lebanese Armed Forces with representatives of the other three agencies was also established.
9. The CBF is composed of approximately 800 personnel proportional to the strength of the different security agencies. It is commended by a General from the Lebanese Armed Forces, whose deputy is a Colonel from the Internal Security Forces. Joint operations arc conduct from a common operations centre; joint planning, improved mobility equipment uplifts and increased communications interoperability are all designed to improve integrated border management practice. Following an initial preparation and execution stages the project has now commenced its consolidation phase.
10. The total length of the northern border is about 100 kilometers representing the CBF area of operations. However, the two official border crossing points within this zone at Arida and Aboudieh ate not part of the CBF”s remit nor is an additional border crossing point at Bokayas, currently under construction, The first 65 kilometers of the bother is marked by the Nahr el Kabir river.
IV. Findings
A. Common Border Force
11. Although the NBPP is now deemed to be in a consolidation phase, the Team believes that it has not yet reached the stage of full implementation for a number of reasons.
12. Some equipment essential for the operation of the CBF has yet to arrive. There have also been cases of incompatibility of equipment and power sources. Consequently, the CBF has had to commence its operations without all the necessary equipment in place. Training for the CBF personnel was provided by Denmark, which has established a training centre and a Lebanese chaired training secretariat. The CBF appears to be making promising progress with “on the job training” which is a positive step to gaining experience.
13. The CBF has been equipped with a range of 4×4 vehicles, All Terrain Vehicles (ATV) or “quad bikes,” which are suitable for operations in the more inaccessible parts of the border and for mobile patrols. These patrols must be well planned and executed in a non-routine and variable way in order to gain the element of surprise. There was no evidence to indicate that they are used in this way. These types of operations must be based on sound analysis of available intelligence. While such an intelligence and analysis component has been established within the CBF, there did not appear to be any output or coordination among the agencies, nor was the Team given any instance where an operation was launched by the CBP based on specific intelligence. It would appear that the exchange of intelligence information is not shared or coordinated among the agencies, even though they are supposed to operate as a single unit within the CBF. The current level of operational integration between the four agencies is sub-optimal and leaves room for improvement. It should be noted, however, that such integration takes time in order to build a sense of trust between the agencies.
14. Concern has been expressed regarding the manner in which the NBPP has been planned and executed. It has been claimed that the lack of an overall strategic concept at the outset and the absence of a detailed implementation plan have had an adverse effect on achieving the desired goals of the CBF. It remains important, however, that the project should continue to be supported by donors and that the CBF be allocated the necessary resources to demonstrate that is sustainable.
B. Official Border Crossing Points
15. This report refers specifically to the official BCPs located along the Lebanon-Syrian border namely, Arida, Aboudieh, Kaa, Masnaa, and Bokayaa which is still under construction.
16. In order to achieve full and absolute control over these official BCPs, certain basic measure are required, such as proper fencing of the control areas. In addition, relocating premises close to the border should be a high priority, as is currently being undertaken at al Aboudieh
17. The situation at Arida border crossing point has clanged little from previous reports. While it is the only operating border crossing point that is located directly at the border, the building in which General Security and General Customs operate is still at the same location. A new site has already been identified and cleared although construction has yet to commence. When completed, this site should be utilized in such a way as to facilitate a one-stop control system.
18. The border crossing point at Aboudieh reflects the most visible changes initiated when compared with the visit of LIBAT I. The location of the border checkpoint has been moved directly to the border. The newly-constructed site provides separated lanes for arriving and departing traffic and sufficient space for vehicles/trucks to be inspected.
Both the General Security and General Customs share the same premise, which fosters an integrated border management (IBM) approach and the execution of a one-stop control. The newly constructed site is not completely operational yet, due to a lack of power supply. The new border crossing point should be fully operational by mid-September 2008 depending on progress.
19. Although Bokayaa border crossing point was scheduled to be operational by July 2007, it is still under construction. Lebanese officials present at the site provided a promising plan. The deficiencies listed in the LIBAT I report had been duly considered. Prefabricated offices are due to be installed directly at the border facilitating both General Security and General Customs working closely together and close to the actual border. It remains to be seen whether this border crossing point, once completed, will meet IBM requirements. It was noticed that the Syrian authorities have completed a new border crossing point structure on their side of the border.
20. The Team saw no changes at Kaa border crossing point from one year ago. A major problem is the long distance between the actual border line and the checkpoint (approximately 12 km). According to the Lebanese officials the Team met at the location, there are no plans to move the site closer to the border at this time.
21. At Masnaa border crossing point, the main entry point for trucks, a few changes could be observed. Again, the major problem is the long distance between the actual border line and the checkpoint (approximately 8 km). Existing plans to move the location closer to the border line have not been initiated to date. However, as an interim arrangement, neighboring lands have been purchased and the site has been satisfactorily redesigned. As far as vehicle flow is concerned, the arriving traffic is separated into two lanes, one for passenger vehicles and buses and the other for trucks carrying cargo. Trucks no longer need to cross lanes to a site for inspection as was the case before.
22. A significant change for the better at Masnaa has been the installation of a scanner unit which has been operational for almost a year. An average of 30 trucks per day are scanned out of a total of approximately 200 arriving into Lebanon at this border crossing point. No clear indication as to how these trucks are being selected was provided. There appears to be no standardized risk assessment applied, and random selection seems to be based upon the manifest and the intuition of the General Customs officers. According to the Lebanese authorities, no weapons or related material has been detected so far at Masnaa or any of the other border crossing points, although contraband items have been intercepted. Notwithstanding this, the Team was informed that all trucks are subject to a tailgate inspection. For this to be achieved there is a minimum requirement for 35 General Customs to to be present at any given time. The Team could observe that the current procedure results in long queues of trucks awaiting clearance. Some trucks are required to be emptied, depending on screening.
23. However, the entire location at Masnaa remains disorganized and highly unsystematic. It is possible to enter Lebanon without being properly checked by devising a route that circumvents these measures.
24. According to the General Security and General Customs personnel interviewed by the Team, there is only limited local coordination with Syrian counterparts; this matter was referred to as a competency of the respective headquarters of the agencies.
25. Perimeters of the border crossing points are only partially fenced and no additional fencing at any crossing points was noticed. Only the newly constructed site at Aboudieh seems to be sufficiently fenced.
26. With the exception of El Abboudieh, no progress has been made at any of the border crossing points to meet the recommended “one-stop control” measure.
27. Immigration checks at all border crossing points are carried out in buildings that have separate entrances for arriving and departing passengers. However, no such separation between those groups could be observed inside the buildings. The system for passenger control, checking of cargo and selection of vehicles and trucks for more thorough examination was on the whole inadequate. Only limited coordination between General Security and General Customs could be observed. The extent to which intelligence is used could not be determined. Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) for the border crossing points, including regulations regarding the movement and checking of persons, vehicles and goods inside the control have not bee compiled. The Team was informed that some female General Security officers are deployed at the border crossing points.
28. The passport identification system at all locations visited has been computerized. However, the system is only geared to read Lebanese passports and identity cards.
C. Green Border
29. Prior to the Team visit to the Green Border, several of the Lebanese key actors, including the Lebanese Border Security Committee, indicated that progress on the eastern Green Border (outside CBF responsibility) was minimal, if not completely absent. During its field visits, the Team found this to be very much the case.
30. Along the northern Green Border (within the CBF area of responsibility), it was found that most of the LIBAT I recommendations concerning its management have been initiated to a greater or lesser degree.
31. Training programs for border specific competencies have begun within the NBP. Non-military bother security skills have been introduced, visible through the deployment of personnel and location of observation posts with the focus on border control and less on territorial defense. Mobile patrols were also performed in small, mobile units.
32. Nevertheless, evidence was found that 4×4 vehicles are still crossing the Green Border in the north. It was also observed by the Team that the checking of light traffic, i.e. pedestrians or two-wheeled vehicles, is not habitually undertaken. This was illustrated in one location when a moped driver chose to cross a dry river bed next to a CBF observation post in the presence of the Team and to his surprise was asked to produce identity documents.
33. It is the Team”s assessment that the potential for reaching an acceptable level of border control along the northern Green Border is present despite some shortcomings of the NBPP. The extent to which it is being effective should be the subject of an assessment that in undertaken as part of a comprehensive review of the CBF. Such an assessment should be performed preferably in conjunction with that of the NBPP expected before the termination of the present consolidation phase of the project.
34. The deployment of personnel and the location of observation posts wore still almost exclusively based on military doctrines, i.e. static, fortified observation posts in strength. This seems also to be the case concerning the cross-border areas controlled by Palestinian groups where it is crucial to maintain efficient control of any movement into Lebanese controlled areas, as these areas are open into Syria.
35. It was claimed that mobile patrols were performed and always in strength (minimum 10 personnel). However, during the Team”s two days of ground and one day of airborne observations, no mobile patrol activity was seen on the eastern border
36. Along the east, no border-specific training has been introduced to the Lebanese Armed Forces. Despite some recognition of the need, no such training has been requested by military commanders. Very little border-specific equipment has been issued to the Lebanese Armed Forces along the eastern Green Border where there is still a clear need for improvement In this regard. However, the Team noted that when asked, Lebanese Army commanders included the need for both military and border-management specific equipment although the latter should be the priority given the Lebanese Armed Forces” role along the Green Border.
37. The situation along the eastern Green Border has seen virtually no progress and this Green Border remains as penetrable as was the case during the LIBAT I mission. The primary reason for this lack of progress given by the Border Security Committee and commanders on the ground is the standing decision by the Lebanese Government to first complete the consolidation phase and subsequent assessment of the NBPP and await the Government”s subsequent decisions.
38. There is still a pressing need to separate legal and illegal cross-border activities for both the northern and the eastern borders. Only a single location is known to the Team where a small, light traffic border crossing has been established and that exercises full control over the legitimacy of persons crossing the border, allowing Local Lebanese inhabitants with socio-based needs to cross (i.e. education, medical treatment, cross border land ownership, etc.) according to a list of names created by the Lebanese Aimed Forces and the local community.
39. There are still countless signs of uncontrolled cross-border traffic, including vehicles. This is in particular the case in the east, where in many areas barns or physical roadblocks have been erected but are either quickly removed or simply bypassed by local illegal cross-border traffic.
D. Beirut seaport
40. The internal security features of the port have been improved through the creation of fences that serve to separate and divide several areas of the port into zones. During the LIBAT I visit the construction of these fences was underway.
41. Access control to the port requires further improvement, including the need for identity cards with security features for staff and the separation of the customer car park from the main premises of the port. LIBAT was informed that a project was underway to introduce identity cards with security features. However, this has yet to be done. Although an area has be designated for car parking, this would best be situated outside the premises of the port.
42. The team was informed that work is underway to construct a new passenger terminal for the clearance of crew members and ship passengers, In the interim, ship crews are landed either at shipside or at a designated area.
43. Cooperation continues to be insufficient amongst the four agencies that are mandated to secure the port. General Customs and the Lebanese Armed Forces duplicate their efforts by performing separate container checks at different locations within the premises of the port. The Team was informed that the General Customs now board ships that are docked at the port. Handheld detectors and ancillary equipment have been received from the USA. In addition, General Customs continues to select merchandise for detailed examination, while the Lebanese Armed Forces is said to check all merchandise that enters the port. The Team doubts that the Lebanese Armed Forces can effectively examine all 200,000 containers and other bulk items that enter the port annually. In this regard, it is more effective to select containers for detailed examination based on risk assessment and intelligence.
44. There were no reports of any seizure of weapons or ammunition by General Customs or the Lebanese Armed Forces at the port. However, General Customs has reported seizures of some smuggled merchandise such as counterfeit clothes, watches and cosmetics. One seizure of drugs occurred. The Team was informed that, in general, the priority of General Customs is to focus on the collection of revenue. It is very important that General Customs concentrate on checking for the illegal importation of arms, ammunition and bomb precursor equipment.
E. Tripoli seaport
45. The Team consulted with senior officials from the Lebanese Armed Forces and General Customs at Tripoli port. There have be no changes in security measures since a report completed by the United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKQ) in March 2007. The recommendations from that report were endorsed in the LIBAT I report.
46. Senior officers emphasized the need to acquire equipment in particular scanners. They also pointed to the requirement for additional space to improve the port facility and accommodate more vessels. For the immediate future, however, the priority should be on preventing the possibility for the importation of illegal arms and ammunition and ensuring that SOPs regarding the examination of cargo include adequate risk analysis and that those measures follow clear unambiguous procedures,
F. Beirut airport
47. Many of the recommendations from LIBAT I concerning the airport have not been implemented. There is still insufficient physical separation between incoming and outgoing cargo. The Docu-boxes were said to be utilized. However, during the Team”s visit it was reported that they are temporarily out of order mid are being updated. General Customs” systems are computerized and currently utilizing the ASYCUDA II software. However, this system is not yet installed at any of the legal border crossing points which limits the overall operational benefit of the system. There is no evidence that the existing data storage system of either General Customs or General Security has been updated. General Security has reported some success in apprehending persons attempting to enter Lebanon illegally. According to the Lebanese authorities at Beirut airport, there have been no reports of any seizure of weapons at the airport.
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48. At the airport, the four agencies are integrated under the leadership of the head of the Security Committee. However, there seems to he a lack of synergy and coordination. Agencies at critical junctures seem to follow internal orders more closely instead of an integrated approach. This is evidenced by the lack of coordination to implement the LIBAT I recommendations that were specific to the airport. While there have been attempts to implement some of the key LIBAT I recommendations to improve security at the airport, some are only at the planning stage.
49. There is continued improvement of equipment support for all agencies with a view to increasing efficiency. These include the French bilateral project, which comprises an equipped document laboratory for the detection of fraudulent travel documents. This laboratory is operational and officials at the airport have reported approximately 30 seizures of fraudulent documents during the laboratory”s first 3-4 months of operation. The French bilateral project is expected to continue with new outputs such as training in canine handling and search techniques.
50. Overall, the staff of General Security and General Customs has been increased with the employment of additional officers, including females. The Team was shown two female staff stationed at different entry points within the airport who it was said were responsible for searching female passengers. It was also reported to the Team that all persons must enter through metal detectors irrespective of gender.
51. The Team was informed that the airport”s security will soon be further enhanced by donations of hand-held detectors received by private donors and that the Government of Lebanon has procured three additional x-ray machines. It is expected that two of these will be placed at the conveyor belts in the customs hall and the other will be used at airside.
G. Lebanese Strategy on Border Security
52. It is evident that the transition from a situation with virtually open borders and inadequate experience in border security management to one where the Government upholds and enforces the control of its borders would be an enormous task for any country. To do so in the complex political and security environment that characterizes Lebanon currently is complicated in the extreme.
53. This illustrates the need for high-level strategic steering of the process based on a strategic master plan that formulates a future vision for Lebanese border security and charts a programme of action towards that objective.
54. It may be the case that the political challenges Lebanon currently faces means that certain aspects of this strategic plan are left pending, These challenges, however, should not serve as a reason to delay the initiation of a process to produce such a plan.
55. It is the opinion of the Team that the lack of strategic steering as encapsulated in a muster plan bears considerable responsibility for the inactivity, in particular along the eastern border.
56. The lack of strategic planning has meant the absence of a clarification of the Government of Lebanon”s desired end state for border security (even in imperfect shape), the ways and means of achieving this, a description of the phases and stations along the way and a process of self-assessment by the relevant Lebanese authorities in view of the strategically-defined level of proficiency and effectiveness required. This situation has contributed to a number of factors that have had a negative impact on the Lebanese potential to uphold and enforce control of its borders.
57. The absence of strategic planning has had as a consequence or contributed to;
l The lack of at least a tentative common approach by Lebanese authorities on the future structure for security agencies with border responsibilities;
l The absence of a process to identify needs from the international community and a system to coordinate the provision of such assistance;
l The need for ad hoc decisions causing frustration among the personnel of the responsible agencies (i.e. instruction on reopening already closed illegal border crossings);
l The almost crippling lack of implementation of even basic measures (as identified in the LIBAT I report), while waiting for the assessment of the NBPP;
l The lack of a process of self-assessment and development in particular on the eastern border.
H. International Donor Nations
58. A number of donor nations have contributed to the efforts of enhancing Lebanon”s border security. Some contributions are either part of the donor nations own bi-lateral projects with Lebanon. Other contributions have supported the NBPP.
59. Consultations, both as group meetings or individual sessions, were car ried out with the donor nations, international organizations and key Lebanese actors. During the consultations, the Team observed that neither the Government of Lebanon nor donor nations had established an adequate mechanism to coordinate strategically the provision of international assistance.
60. Although forums for an overall planning do exist, consultations and exchanges of information, often as ad hoc measures, are taking place between the donor nations. This would suggest that the overall forum is not functioning to any great satisfaction and ad hoc measures are used as a substitute for strategic coordination and planning, as has been confirmed by certain donor nation representatives. This situation gives rise to overlaps, gaps or inconsistencies in capacity building and more. It is, therefore, seen as a vital precondition for efficient donor nation support that such a mechanism is introduced.
61. However, it remains that efforts being invested into the NBPP are encouraging. They may serve as the basis for further expansion of the current border security arrangements to the eastern border subsequent to an assessment process and the decision of the Government of Lebanon.
62. It is, however, important that donor nations continue to support the NBPP as the CBF remains the main vehicle for progress, a potential platform for an expansion to Lebanon”s eastern border and a possible model for a dedicated and, or, independent border guard agency. Despite its suggested shortcomings and the differences of opinion on the NBPP it is the Team”s assessment that an amputated or even collapsed CBF would represent a major setback for Lebanese border security.
I. Suggested next steps
63. There are a number of measures that can be taken, and processes that can be initiated, by the Lebanese authorities in the immediate and mid-term to enhance the effectiveness of Lebanon”s border security arrangements. These should continue to be seen in the framework of the LIBAT I recommendations and the continuing activities of the CBF.
64. Given the need for greater Lebanese strategic direction and the lack of a strategic framework at the outset of the NBPP, it is now essential that Lebanon take ownership of this project. In this regard, the Government of Lebanon should develop such a framework that indicates timelines and performance benchmarks for the continued implementation of the project.
65. Consideration should be given to issuing a common article of uniform to each member of the CBF, such as a beret, shoulder flash and other elements which may help to instill a sense of unity within the CBF.
66. At the official border crossing points further specialized training is required. Additional cross-agency training should be provided to enhance the understanding and implementation of the philosophy of IBM.
67. A systematic risk assessment and analysis procedure should be urgently developed and applied at all border crossing points in order to accelerate the clearance of trucks and cargo, as well as passenger vehicles. Newly-delivered equipment requires efficient use as quickly as possible.
68. The Government of Lebanon should provide the necessary laws and guidance where amendments to the current legal framework are required (or recommended) so as to improve procedure at the border crossing points. Furthermore, the various agencies responsible for border security should be encouraged to develop and issue SOPs considering a common IBM philosophy.
69. The Lebanese Government should consider the expansion of the NBPP to include responsibility for the border crossing points. This would certainly increase the possibility of an exchange of information (intelligence) amongst the agencies involved and help maximize the coordination and cooperation among them. The long term goal should be to create one single entity, separate from the four agencies currently tasked with certain aspects of border security, or as a part of one of the agencies, adequately staffed and budgeted for.
70. Additional equipment has been received at all border crossing points, mainly in the form of IT equipment, from the donor countries but it is not yet fully functional. Related training has been provided. The effective and efficient use of equipment, particularly IT equipment, should be a priority.
71. Greater priority should be directed to those border crossing points along the eastern border. The Team was informed that the lack of action along the eastern border was due to a pending decision by the Government of Lebanon on whether to extend the CBF to incorporate the eastern border. Priority has been given to the NBPP and Masnaa border crossing point. Given that the NBPP and the mandate o the CBF excludes border crossing points, finalization of the project and waiting for the respective evaluation should not serve as an excuse for not implementing some of the LIBAT I recommendations. Many of them could and should have been at least attempted or commenced under existing conditions and with minimal cost.
72. As stated in the LIBAT I report, the incomplete delineation of Lebanon”s border with the Syrian Arab Republic still hampers border control and demotivates border security agencies when having to intervene in areas that are not clearly marked. Therefore, it is necessary for this issue to be addressed vigorously.
V. Conclusions and Recommendations
73. Taking into consideration that some of the recommendations put forward in the LIBAT I report relied on political obstacles to be addressed prior to their implementation, and given the political climate in Lebanon during the past year, it is understandable that not all recommendations have been implemented.
74. However, the LIBAT I report did put forward a number of recommendations that could have be implemented by the Lebanese authorities without significant, or any, financial or political implications and without changes in the organizational structure of the border management agencies.
75. The Team observed that a number of the recommendations in the LIBAT I report have been incorporated and implemented through the establishment of CBF in the framework of the NBPP. Though these recommendations have not always been exploited to their full potential, this does represent a significant step forward. Unfortunately this is not the case concerning most of the border crossing points and along the eastern Green Border.
76. At the airport and seaports some minor progress could be observed, but there still remains considerable worn for improvement.
77. In conclusion, there has been some progress on the northern border through the CBF and some minor improvements at other locations. In general, however, Lebanon has not yet succeeded in enhancing the overall security of its borders in any significant manner.
78. The LIBAT II, therefore, reiterates the full set of recommendations as contained in the LIBAT I report as they are equally valid now as they were one year ago. Although some of the recommendations have been implemented in part or in modified form they should, where possible, be implemented as soon as possible. The LIBAT I recommendations are as follows:
l A multi-agency mobile force focusing on arms smuggling should be established with the purpose of ensuring efficient arms seizures through its intelligence and rapid interception capabilities.
l An intelligence and analysis component should be established within the multi- agency unit with the purpose of gaining access to all relevant intelligence from the four agencies, analyzing it and providing the four agencies and the multi-agency force with profitable targets identified.
l International border security experts should be deployed to the multi-agency unit and its embedded intelligence and analysis cell, to all four agencies on all levels to advise on non-military border security aspects and related training and to an advisory secretariat consisting of both international advisers and representatives from the Lebanese border security agencies.
l A dedicated border guard agency should be established as part of a long-term strategy to streamline border security procedures and gather all expertise, information and intelligence in one agency.
l Full and absolute control should be established over border crossing points by creating SOPs, including regulations for any movement inside the control area of persons, vehicles and goods, standardized compulsory measures for checking compliance and anti-corruption mechanisms and by modifying the infrastructures, where appropriate.
l Measures should be instituted to separate legal and illegal near-border or border- crossing activities so as to create a transparent and unambiguous environment, such as restricting movements in some areas, marking the borderline, establishing additional local border crossing points, relocating crossings to the borderline and providing socio-economic programmes, as an alternative to families reliance on smuggling.
l Training programmes should be established for the four agencies at all levels to transform the border security concept and doctrines into a highly professional and skilled civilian approach where possible, building or drawing from the training experience of the NBPP and implementing practical aspects of the internationally agreed border management concept relating to cooperation and coordination, intelligence gathering, technical skills and risk analysis
l The provision of border-specific equipment to all agencies should be enhanced for the purpose of increasing efficiency and serving as a force multiplier, including air and land surveillance equipment, communications equipment, vehicles, scanners, other inspection devices and all required computer hardware and software.
l Cooperation with Syrian counterparts should be established, in particular at the operational level, making border security management a joint effort to secure the border and prevent illegal cross-border activities.
79. In order to ensure that the process of reaching an efficient and effective Lebanese border control system increases and maintains momentum, LIBAT II makes the following supplementary recommendation:
l A strategic plan should be developed. This plan should clarify the end state that the Government of Lebanon wishes to achieve with regard to its border control system, the ways and means of achieving this, a description of the phases and stations along the way and develop a process of self-assessment by the relevant Lebanese authorities in view of the strategically-defined level of proficiency and effectiveness required. This should take into consideration the concept o f IBM and the recommendations put forward in the LIBAT I report.
80. It is further recommended that:
Donor nations actively ensure that the coordination and cooperation of their activities in accordance with the Lebanese requirements is enhanced to achieve the optimum output from their efforts, either by cultivating the existing mechanism or adopting a new one.