A Second Chance for Syria
The reconciliation initiative put forth by Saudi Arabia at the Kuwait summit was not merely prompted by the horrific events of Gaza, but also by a clear political conviction that priority should be given to the most important, rather than the important. The Kingdom became aware that the Israeli military monopoly on the Gaza inhabitants would not have been so brutal if Arabs hadn”t been divided. It considered that a minimum level of Arab consensus is necessary in order to reflect on Palestinians and restore a minimum level of unity between them – especially with the coming of a new US administration and the potential revival of the peace process in the region. Hence, there were no more reservations about dealing with Syria, so that it would not monopolize either – after having lost on more than one "front" – or make a hasty response.
Damascus, which constitutes almost on its own the Arab "opposition axis", and shares with Tehran the cards of Hamas and Hezbollah, seemed to be, during and after the Gaza war, weaker than before and prone to more isolation – particularly since it decided to freeze its indirect negotiations with Israel, which constituted at a certain time a reason for breaking Europe”s (especially France”s) boycott.
Syria”s alliance with Iran did not allow it to successfully play Hamas” card, and the two allies” stances were clearly divergent. Whereas Syrians wanted to open the Lebanese front, even if on a limited basis, in order to relieve the Palestinian Islamic movement, Iranians considered that the "Lebanese internal scene" is more important. Indeed, for them, priority must be given to the electoral battle that will be waged and maybe won, by the Lebanese Hezbollah-led opposition in a few months. Iranian envoy to Damascus and Beirut Ali Larijani declared that the opening of a front in South Lebanon would assuredly reflect negatively on Hezbollah”s penetration of the Christian ranks and distance Michel Aoun”s supporters. This was further explained by the declaration of Iran”s Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei about Hamas not needing military support, when he forbade Iranian enthusiasts from going to fight in Gaza, saying that "nothing can be done in this regard."
The second Syrian weak point appeared in the failure to provide quorum for the emergency Doha summit and its replacement with the "Gaza meeting", then in Lebanon”s stance during this meeting. Despite the fact that President Michel Sleiman was among the first who approved the summit, he linked his participation to meeting the quorum, or else negotiations would be sufficient. This was not to the liking of Damascus, and its allies protested against him in their demonstrations to support Gaza. Their media also criticized this stance, but it did not affect the Lebanese President”s determination to take a completely opposing stance to that of Damascus, when he expressed reservations about the clause of rejecting the Arab initiative and preventing the slipping of his country into one of the two Arab axes.
The Lebanese stance has also another dimension, with the impending start of the works of the international tribunal on Hariri”s assassination, and the assurance of UN Secretary General, during his visit to Beirut a few days ago, that this mechanism has been launched and cannot be stopped. This is also supposed to be a source of concern for Syria.
As for the war on Gaza itself, and despite the fact that the Israeli aggression was premeditated, planned and merely waiting for a pretext, it is clear that Hamas, then Damascus were guilty of miscalculation. This was revealed by the movement”s politburo head Khaled Meshal, when he declared that he had been expecting a "swift victory" on Israel within a few days. Damascus, on the other hand, was expecting a "swift victory" on Egypt, which it did not obtain, despite Hezbollah”s calls to the Egyptian people and army to "rebel". On the contrary, Egypt grew stronger after the campaign against it and was able to gather, in Sharm el Sheikh, the leaders of Europe, who had already changed their stance towards Syria. Sakozy himself told his politicians that when he contacted Damascus for pushing it to pressure Hamas into accepting the ceasefire, he concluded that its main concern was to "weaken Egypt".
Hence, Syria came to the Kuwait summit "weakened", and Saudi Arabia gave it a second chance to return to the rank of Arab unity, despite some Egyptian reservations. Will it take advantage of this or go back to moving cards and allies? Perhaps, what took place at the meeting of foreign ministers in Kuwait after the reconciliation is not very promising.