Hizbullah”s political participation: necessity over ambition
By midnight June 8, as it became increasingly clear that the March 14 coalition had retained its majority, a stubborn disbelief prevailed in Hizbullah”s stronghold in the southern suburbs of Beirut. "No, it”s impossible that they won. It”s still too soon to tell," one Hizbullah supporter insisted.
By the next morning, however, the results had been confirmed: the final tally gave the March 14 bloc 69 seats in the 128-seat Parliament along with two allied independents to the opposition”s 57. For an election that was the closest-fought in more than three decades – the results of which had been impossible to predict with any certainty right up until the 7:00 a.m. opening of the polling stations – it was a significant victory for March 14.
Saad Hariri, the leader of the Future Movement, the main Sunni political body, will be the next prime minister; his aides were admitting he would stand for the post even before the final results were confirmed.
The outcome, however, could mark the political demise of Michel Aoun, the Christian opposition leader. Although he still heads the largest Christian bloc in the new Parliament, the defeat of the opposition was largely due to his inability to rally the majority of Christians to his side. Indeed, some of his elected candidates owe their success to non-Christian voters – the Shiites in Jbeil, Baabda, and Jezzine – and to the Armenians in Metn.
The March 14 victory is a setback for Hizbullah which had hoped that an opposition win would provide a protective seal around its military wing. Contrary to scare-mongering rhetoric from some Israeli and Western officials, Hizbullah had no desire or interest in assuming control of the state if the opposition had triumphed.
Hizbullah”s history of participation in Lebanese constitutional politics has always been one of necessity rather than ambition. In 1992, after a heated internal debate, it submitted candidates for the first post-Civil War election in recognition that a parliamentary presence would help sustain the party and the resistance in the new era of Pax Syriana. It neither sought, nor was asked, to join successive governments until 2005 following Syria”s disengagement from Lebanon, when it entered the first government of Prime Minister Fouad Siniora. Hizbullah appreciated that the absence of Syria”s protective umbrella required a more direct political engagement in order to defend its resistance priority.
The same holds true today. Protecting its weapons, not running the Lebanese state, remains Hizbullah”s principal motivation for political participation. If the opposition had won, Hizbullah probably would have preferred to fade into the background, leaving its allies to helm the government on a daily basis.
The party has invested enormous effort and expense in rebuilding and honing its military capabilities since the 2006 war with Israel. The level of recruitment, training and rearming is unprecedented in its 27-year history.
Hizbullah officials do not disguise the extent of the build-up, even if they are circumspect on the details. Even Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah found time to state that Hizbullah has more weapons than at any time since 1982, during his televised speech on June 8 in which he acknowledged defeat at the polls.
The March 14 bloc has said it is open to forming another government of national unity, while ruling out the option of offering the opposition a veto-wielding share of Cabinet seats. The Doha agreement of May 2008 granted the opposition a blocking third as a conciliatory gesture to ease tensions following the factional fighting that month in Beirut and the Chouf and Aley districts. But it was intended as a once-only measure to last until the June 2009 elections.
The dilemma facing Hizbullah is that without the one-third blocking share, it is vulnerable to fresh attempts to disarm its military wing. Mohammad Raad, the head of Hizbullah”s parliamentary bloc, quickly set the tone for future negotiations over the composition and agenda of the government. "The majority must commit not to question our role as a resistance party, the legitimacy of our weapons arsenal and the fact that Israel is an enemy state," he told AFP, the French news agency, a day after the polls.
On the other hand, what action is Hizbullah – the most powerful political and military entity in the country – prepared to take to persuade March 14 to back down and re-offer the blocking share?
Much depends on the wisdom of March 14. If its leaders feel emboldened by its electoral mandate and continued US and Saudi support to begin maneuvering to weaken Hizbullah”s hold over its weapons, it surely will provoke a fresh crisis.