Iranian leaders need to acknowledge – and address – public dissatisfaction
This week’s developments in Iran might not represent anything as dramatic as a “tipping point,” or decisive juncture in the course of events. But the tug-of-war that continues to play itself out is a sign of a simple and basic truth, which Iranian leaders can ignore at their own peril. The country will be flirting with disaster if it continues on its current path, and fails to carry out a continuous, incremental accommodation with its critics.
Iran’s rulers might have absolutely no stomach for reaching any kind of arrangement with Mir Hossein Mousavi, which is perhaps understandable, given their position. But that’s not the kind of accommodation that must take place in order for the country to recover.
The broad, political agreement that must be fashioned in Iran must take place with a more formidable political player, namely the two-thirds of the country, roughly speaking, that is age 25 and under.
In their heart of hearts, Iran’s leaders are probably aware of the following: it’s easy to blame foreign instigation for the recent unrest, or the bad taste leftover from a given election, but the reality is that people are dissatisfied. Whatever one thinks of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, or Mousavi, or any of the other key players, Iran’s leaders must recognize this dissatisfaction and address it. If the powers-that-be truly believe that there’s no justification for such feelings of discontent, which is different from disloyalty, then we might see the regime take the “easier” option: let the Revolutionary Guards and similar elements have the upper hand, and finish off any popular movement for change.
Iran is a difficult country to pin down on the “political science” map. It has institutions: Parliament, presidency, etc., and regular elections. But the output of these institutions has been lacking.
They’ve been hampered by the fact that the supreme leader, wielding tools like the Revolutionary Guards, stands in the background, where he arbitrates and manages the process in a way that undercuts the legitimacy of the state’s official political institutions.
The leaders of Iran can wield the Pasdaran like a stick, but the country can only recover if it gets a carrot, in the form of the country’s institutions. They cannot remain mere atmospherics; they must be activated and allowed to shape political life. Iran brags about its elections, institutions and Constitution. If they were functioning properly, we’d be seeing a more comfortable scenario of Ahmadinejad leading the government, and Mousavi leading the opposition.
The Shah of Iran learned the hard way that resorting to security agencies and ordering a crack-down to maintain stability has a finite usefulness. The real levers of power in Iran are the people and the institutions that represent them soundly.